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REPEAL OF STATUTES BY IMPLICATION AS
APPLIED TO THE "TEN DAY" DIVORCE
IN INDIANA
By CHARLES LEVIN*
Considerable conflict has arisen over the interpretation and
construction of the recent enactment of the legislature, being
Chap. 213, Acts of 1935, page 1019, entitled:
"AN ACT to amend section 1 of an act entitled "An act to amend
section 367 of an act entitled 'An act concerning proceedings in civil
cases,' approved April 7, 1881," approved March 8, 1883."
This act provides for some changes in civil procedure.
Recited therein is the specific amendment of Section 367
of the Civil Practice Act of 1881, Section 2-1905 Burns' Ann.
St. 1933. Among other things, the act provides:
1. That the plaintiff may fix the day by endorsement on the com-
plaint on which the defendant shall appear.
2. That if summons be personally served ten days before such
day (or publication made in the manner provided), such action shall
thereupon stand for issue and trial on such day.
3. That "the provisions of this act shall apply to all suits and
proceedings for divorce."
It is apparent that this act is inconsistent with the Acts of
1923, page 467, Sec. 3-1211 Burns' Ann. St. 1933, reading
as follows:
"The trial of no cause for absolute or limited divorce shall be had
or heard by any court until after the expiration of sixty days from the
date of issue of such summons as shall have been duly served on the
defendant's spouse or from the date of the publication of the first
notice to a non-resident defendant. Any trial had or decree rendered
in any such case in less than such sixty days shall be null and void."
* Of the Hammond, Indiana, Bar.
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In 1873, the original act pertaining to civil procedure was
passed (Acts of 1873, chapter 43, Section 13). This act
made provisions as follows:
"The cause shall stand.for issue and trial at the first term of court
after the summons has been personally served upon the defendant at
least 10 days, or publication has been made thirty days before the first
day of such term."
In 1881 the legislature, evincing a desire to speed up the
trial of civil cases, included in the act on civil procedure the
section which the Acts of 1935, page 1019, purports to
amend. The Act of 1881 (Chap. 38, page 240, Sec. 376),
provided among other things:
1. That every action shall stand for trial at the first term after
commenced, if summons had been served ten days, or publication made
thirty days before the first day of such term.
2. That the plaintiff may fix the day, by endorsement on the com-
plaint, on which the defendant shall appear.
The amendment of 1935, it can be seen, simply moved up
the trial day from the term following the filing of a com-
plaint, to a date any time after the expiration of ten days
after summons had been served. It is now possible to file
and try a case within the same term, whereas, previously, this
could not be done.
The Act of 1881 applied to "every action." However, to
omit any doubt about proceedings for divorce, the legislature
in 1883 added another sentence to the Act of 1881. Acts of
1883, Ch. 133, page 199, reads as follows:
"And it is also provided, that the provisions of this act shall apply to
all suits and proceedings for divorce, the same as all other actions."
It is obvious that subsequent to the passage of this act,
divorce proceedings could be tried and determined on any day
of the term following which the action was filed, provided,
however, that ten days had elapsed after summons had been
served, or thirty days in the case of publication, as applicable
to other civil proceedings. Evidently this practice was fol-
lowed, for the case of MacFarland v. MacFarland, 40 Ind.
"TEN DAY" DIVORCE IN INDIANA
458, reveals the trial of a divorce proceeding approximately
54 days after it was commenced, noting, however, that the
action was begun during vacation and also the fact that publi-
cation was necessary. The case of Thompson v. Thompson,
132 Ind. 288, 291, reveals the commencement of an action
on October 12, 1886, and the granting of a divorce on the
following day, the defendant having appeared to the action.
It was apparent, therefore, that if an action was com-
menced and service obtained ten days before the expiration of
one term, trial could be had on the first day of the following
term, so that on the whole, a divorce could be obtained in
eleven days.
In 1913, the legislature, evidently recognizing that some
deterrent should be placed upon the granting of quick di-
vorces, enacted legislation permitting the trial of a divorce
only after 60 days had elapsed following the filing of suit.
But instead of amending the acts of 1881 and 1883, the
legislature concerned itself with the old act of 1873, and
amended section 13 of that act as follows (Acts 1913, Ch. 44,
page 76) :
"The cause shall stand for issue and trial at the first term of court
after summons has been personally served upon the defendant at least
ten days or publication has been made thirty days before the first day
of such term, but in no case shall such trial be had within sixty days
of the filing of the suit."
However, it was not long before this legislation was called
into question. In the case of Panty 'v. Panty, 74 Ind. App.
485, 129 N. E. 283 a plaintiff was granted a divorce 24
days after filing suit. The defense raised the protest that
this was prohibited by statute, whereupon it was contended
that the statute was invalid for the reason that it purported
to amend a statute that had already been superseded by the
Acts of 1881 as amended in 1883. (Acts of 1881, Chap. 38
and Acts of 1883, Chap. 133.)
This contention was upheld by the Appellate Court, with
particular reference to the act of 1883, being the amendment
concerning the trial of divorces. The court held thus:
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"Section 367 (of the acts of 1881*) as amended in 1883 is not sup-
plemental to section 13, acts of 1873, and the two are repugnant. It
shows that section 13, by the enactment of 1883, was repealed by
implication."
The effect of the ruling in Panty v. Panty, supra, and the
holding of the Act of 1913 invalid was an endorsement of
the trial of a divorce within a comparatively short period of
time, and the Acts of 1881 and 1883 remained the governing
factors as far as the period of elapsed time was concerned.
The efforts of the legislature of 1913 were therefore defeated
and presented the problem of extending the trial period for
divorces to the legislature of 1923.
The legislature of 1923 handled this matter by enacting
the statute cited at the beginning of this article. (Acts of
1923, page 467; Sec. 3-1211, Burns' Ann. St. 1933.) This
act was specific legislation on the subject of divorce and not
on the subject of procedure as had been the previous attempt
of the legislature of 1913. Being a later act, and of a special
nature, it took precedence over the general law pertaining
to the trial of civil cases as far as divorces were concerned.
Pursuant thereto, it was generally conceded that the trial
of a cause for divorce could not be had within sixty days
after the case was filed.
The act of 1935, therefore, raises the question as to
whether a general statute on the subject of the trial of civil
cases, and specifically designating that such procedure shall
relate to divorce actions, repeals by implication the special
statute on divorces as found in the Act of 1923, supra. To
make such a determination, the rules of construction govern-
ing repeal of statutes by implication must be applied.
It is established law that repeal of statutes by implication
is not favored.' However, the Supreme Court of Indiana
* These italics are ours.
1 Spencer v. State, 5 Ind. 41; Blaine v. Bailey, 25 Ind. 165; Water Works
Co. v. Burkhart, 41 Ind. 364; Chamberlain v. City, 77 Ind. 542; Hunt v.
Railway Co., 112 Ind. 69, 13 N. E. 263; Pomeroy v. Beach, 149 Ind. 511,
49 N. E. 263; State v. City of Noblesville, 157 Ind. 31, 60 N. E. 704; Sefton v.
Board, 160 Ind. 357, 66 N. E. 1012; Sosat v. State, 2 Ind. A. 586, 28 N. E. 1017;
City of Indianapolis v. Morris, 25 Ind. A. 409, 58 N. E. 510; Huff v.
142
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has held that this rule is not to be so extended as to require
courts to hold that where the legislature has enacted a law
which purports to apply to all cases of a certain character,
it did not mean what the words imply. 2 It is also established
that when the language of different statutes is so repugnant
as necessarily to destroy the meaning of one, the last enacted
always prevails, 3 and that the later law, embracing the
subject of the former one by implication, repeals the former
one so far as they conflict with each other.4
It is important to remember that there is always a strong
presumption against repeal by implication.5 The instances
where courts have held that a repeal by implication exists
have been based upon the proposition that the court gave
effect to the intention of the legislature, and rests in the
presumption that the legislature intended that the later act
would repeal the former one on the same subject, although
not so stating expressly.0 Hence, the question whether a
new act works an implied repeal of an existing act is always
one of legislative intention,7 which is to be determined by
construction.8
Fetch, 194 Ind. 570, 143 N. E. 705; Florida East Coast Ry. v. Hazel, 43 Fla.
263, 31 So. 272, 99 A. S. R. 114; Ex parte Morgan, 57 Tex. Cr. 551, 124- S. W.
99, 136 A. S. R. 996; Horton v. Mobile School Comrs., 43 Ala. 598; Conner v.
Southern Exp. Co., 37 Ga. 397; Board of Supervisors v. Campbell, 42 Ill. 490;
People v. Barr, 44 Ill. 198; McGillen v. Waiff, 83 Ill. A. 227; People v. San
Francisco R. R. Co., 28 Cal. 254; State v. Berry, 12 Iowa 58; Dawson County
v. Clark, 58 Neb. 756, 79 N. W. 822; Robinson v. Goldboro, 122 N. C. 211,
30 S. E. 324.
2 Pittsburgh Railroad v. Lighheiser, 163 Ind. 247, 71 N. E. 60.
3 Simington v. State, 5 Ind. 479; Farmer's Co. v. Harrah, 47 Ind. 236;
Dowdell v. State, 58 Ind. 333; State v. Smith, 59 Ind. 179; Wright v. Board,
98 Ind. 88; Railroad v. Dunlap, 112 Ind. 93, 13 N. E. 403; District of Columbia
v. Hutton, 143 U. S. 18, 12 Sup. Ct. 369; Union Iron Co. v. Pierce, 4 Biss. 327,
Fed. Cas. No. 14, 367; Mersereau v. Mersereau Co., 51 N. J. Eq. 382, 26 AtI.
682; State v. Halliday, 63 Ohio St. 165, 57 N. E. 1097.
4 Dr. Pann v. City, 22 Ind. 204; Wright v. Board, 98 Ind. 88; Board of
Comm. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 90 Fed. 222, 32 C. C. A. 585; Conners v. Carp
River Iron Co., 54 Mich. 168, 19 N. W. 938.
5 See Note 1. 6 See Note: 14 Am. Dec. 209.
7 U. S. v. Claflin, 97 U. S. 546, 24 U. S. (L. ed.) 1082; Neldon v. Clark,
20 Utah 382, 59 Pac. 524, 77 A. S. R. 928.
8 Huston v. Scott, 20 Okla. 142, 94 Pac. 512, 35 L. R. A. (N. S.) 721;
State v. Lowry, 166 Ind. 372, 77 N. E. 728; U. S. Cement Co. v. Cooper,
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
Applying the rule to the situation herein, it should first
be ascertained from the title of, and recitals in the Act of
1935, as to whether or not, by its enactment, it was the
intention of the legislature to repeal the provisions of the
Act of 1923. This intention must clearly appear, for the
courts will not construe a repeal to exist, if they can find
reasonable grounds to hold to the contrary,9 or if the case be
doubtful. 10
In other words, one statute will not repeal another by
implication unless it appears in the terms and provisions of
the later act that it was the intention of the legislature to
enact a new law in place of the old.1' Or, stated conversely,
courts have repeatedly held that a repeal by implication
cannot be so extended as to include cases not within the
intention of the legislature. 12
To aid in determining the intention of the legislature, rules
of construction permit the following inquiries into the act:
1. Reference to the title.
2. Reference to the preamble.
3. Examination of the substance.
4. Study of the history of the particular legislation.
5. The evils designed to be remedied by the act.
The title of a statute may be a guide where the statute
appears to be ambiguous or doubtful.' 3 The act of 1935
is certainly not ambiguous in its meaning, for it very clearly
172 Ind. 599, 88 N. E. 69; Hyland v. Rochelle, 179 Ind 671, 100 N. E. 842;
Pennsylvania Co. v. Masher, 47 Ind. A. 556, 94 N. E. 899; Greenbush Assn. v.
Van Natta, 29 Ind. A. 192, 94 N. E. 368; Morrison v. Eau Claire, 115 Wis.
538, 95 A. S. R. 955, 92 N. W. 280.
9 Michigan Tele. Co. v. Benton Harbor, 212 Mich. 512, 80 N. W. 368,
47 L. R. A. 104.
10 Morrison v. State ex rel., 181 Ind. 544, 105 N. E. 113; Lake Agricultural
Co. v. Brown, 186 Ind. 30, 114 N. E. 755; Jose v. Hunter, 63 Ind. A. 268,
124 N. E. 65.
11 State v. Coleman, 117 La. 973, 42 So. 471; State v. Superior Court, 60
Wash. 370, 111 Pac. 223, 140 A. S. R. 925; Note, 88 A. S. R. 272.
12 State v. Perkins, 141 N. C. 797, 53 S. E. 735, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 165.
1a Garrigas v. Board, 39 Ind. 66; City of Rushville v. Rushville Co., 132
Ind. 575, 28 N. E. 853; State v. Brugh, 5 Ind. A. 592, 32 N. E. 869; Huff v.
Fetch, 194 Ind. 570, 143 N. E. 705.
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purports to amend the acts of 1881 and 1883. The ambiguity,
if any, exists in whether or not the act was designed to
include the legislation of 1923. If the act of 1923 was to
be amended, such an intention would ordinarily be manifested
by the legislature so stating specifically, for it is a presumption
that the legislature, in the enactment of a statute, considered
all of the existing laws on the subject. 14 If some mention
had been made in the body of the act of the subject of
divorce as well as the subject of procedure, there might have
been some connecting reference to the act of 1923 so as to
give rise to an assumption that the legislature intended to
amend it, as well as the acts of 1881 and 1883 referred to
in the title.
In construing statutes, the courts may look to both the
title and the body of the act. The title is considered in
construing the body, and the whole act is construed together.' 5
In that only the acts of 1881 and 1883 are mentioned in the
title, and no mention of the act of 1923 is made either in
the title or the body, it can hardly be assumed that the legis-
lature intended to imply its repeal. Consequently, regarded
as a whole act, the act of 1935 can only be considered as
amendatory of and related to the acts of 1881 and 1883.
The preamble of a statute may also be considered for the
purpose of ascertaining the intent of the legislature in its
enactment, and the reason or occasion for making the law,'
as well as the general purpose that the legislature had in
mind.17 To determine such intent, the courts will look to
contemporaneous history for the evils sought to be remedied,
and the conditions sought to be corrected.' It Is reasonable
to assume that the effort of the legislatures of both 1913
14 Domestic Coal Co. v. DeArmey, 179 Ind. 592, 100 N. E. 675.
15 Cyrus v. State, 195 Ind. 346, 145 N. E. 497.
16 Hanly v. Sims, 175 Ind. 345, 93 N. E. 228, 94 N. E. 401.
17 Titus v. Town of Bloomfield, 80 Ind. A. 483, 141 N. E. 360.
18 Bailey v. State, 163 Ind. 165, 71 N. E. 655; State v. Lowry, 166 Ind.
372, 77 N. E. 728; Railroad Comm. v. Grand Trunk R. R. Co., 179 Ind. 255,
100 N. E. 852; Hyland v. Rochelle, 179 Ind. 671, 100 N. E. 842; City of Albany
v. Stier, 34 Ind. A. 615, 22 N. E. 275; Klemm v. Fread, 45 Ind. A, 587, 91 N. E.
256; Greenbush Assn. v. Van Natta, 49 Ind. A. 192, 94"N. E. 899; Doney v.
Laughlin, 50 Ind. A. 38, 94 N. E. 1027.
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and 1923 to delay the trial of a divorce proceeding for 60
days was for some remedial purpose. The Act of 1935
can hardly be said to remove such a purpose without a clearly
defined intention so manifested, and to construe a repeal by
implication would be to defeat the purposes of both legis-
latures acting within a more or less contemporaneous period
in their efforts to correct an existing evil.
In the case of Walgreen v. Industrial Com., 323 Ill. 194,
153 N. E. 83, 48 A. L. R. 1199, it was held:
"In the interpretation and construction of statutes, the purpose and
intent of the legislature when the act was passed, must be ascertained
and given effect, if possible, and the words of a statute must be taken
in the sense in which they were understood at the time the statute
was enacted, and in ascertaining such purpose and intent, it is proper
to consider the history of the legislation on the subject enacted at the
same or different sessions and to consider the statutes upon cognate
subjects though not strictly in pari materia". 19
Following this reasoning, the Act of 1935 which embraces
only the subject of civil procedure is effective only as to such
matter, and could not concern itself with nullifying the special
statute of 1923.
It has always been a primary rule of construction that all
statutes upon the same subject are to be construed together
so that all may be given effect and produce a harmonious
system, 20 and if a reasonable construction will enable both
acts to stand, this should be adopted.21  As has been previ-
ously stated, the repeal of statutes by implication not being
favored, courts will, if possible, construe a later statute so
19 Citing: People ex rel. Fyfe v. Barnett, 319 Ill. 403, 150 N. E. 290; Enslye
v. State, 172 Ind. 198, 88 N. E. 62.
20 Snyder v. Thiene Wagner Co., 173 Ind. 659, 90 N. E. 314; Princeton Coal
Co. v. Lawrence, 167 Ind. 469, 95 N. E. 423; Humrichous v. Thomas, 177 Ind.
593, 98 N. E. 419; Hyland v. Rochelle, 179 Ind. 671, 100 N. E. 842; Western
Union v. Sefrit, 38 Ind. A. 565, 78 N. E. 638; Teagarden v. State, 39 Ind.
A. 15, 79 N. E. 211; Campbell v. Indianapolis Tractor Co., 39 Ind. A. 65,
99 N. E. 223; Wilson v. Jackson Hill Coal Co., 48 Ind. A. 150, 95 N. E. 589;
Doney v. Laughlin, 50 Ind. A. 38, 94 N. E. 1027; Johnson v. City of Indian-
apolis, 174 Ind. 691, 93 N. E. 589.
21 In the matter of The Evergreens, 47 N. Y. 216.
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that both laws may stand and be operative.22  It is possible
for two or more statutes upon the same subject to exist with-
out the later statute repealing the prior, 23 and although the
provisions of the different statutes appear to conflict, that
construction will be adopted which will allow both to stand.24
It is entirely possible for the courts to allow both statutes
to stand by declaring that the civil practice act, as amended,
applies to all cases including actions for divorce, but that
the trial of a divorce shall in no case be had within sixty days
after suit has been filed.
In the construction of statutes, the courts have always
considered the provisions of prior statutes upon the same
subject. 26
Where there is a general statute, such as in this case the
acts of 1881 and 1883, as amended by the Act of 1935, in
the absence of an express repealing clause, it has been held
that such statute will not ordinarily repeal a prior special
statute on a like subject, but both statutes will remain in
force and are to be construed together.26  A general statute,
without negative words, cannot repeal a previous particular
statute, even though the provisions in one be different from
the other,27 and in these the presumption against repeal
by implication has a peculiar and special force. 28  If the
22 Collins Coal Co. v. Hadley, 38 Ind. A. 637, 75 N. E. 832, 78 N. E. 353;
Chicago R. R. Co. v. Luddington, 175 Ind. 35, 91 N. E. 939; State v. Ensley, 177
Ind. 483, 97 N. E. 113; Beard v. State, 176 Ind. 353, 95 N. E. 1103.
23 Sefton v. Board, 160 Ind. 357, 66 N. E. 891.
24 State v. Smith, 59 Ind. 179; State v. Wells, 112 Ind. 237, 13 N. E. 263.
25 Advisory Board v. State, 164 Ind. 295, 73 N. E. 700; Cheney v. State,
165 Ind. 212, 74 N. E. 892; Snyder v. Thieme Wagner Co., 173 Ind. 659, 90
N. E. 17; Johnson v. City of Indianapolis, 174 Ind. 691, 93 N. E. 17; State v.
Board, 175 Ind. 400, 94 N. E. 716; Hyland v. Rochelle, 179 Ind. 671, 100 N. E.
842; City of Albany v. Stier, 34- Ind. A. 615, 72 N. E. 275; Greenbush Assn. v.
Van Natta, 49 Ind. A. 192, 94 N. E. 899.
26 Monical v Heise, 49 Ind. A. 302, 94 N. E. 232.
27 Com. of Penn. ex rel. Ruth Mathews v. Sallie Lomas, 302 Pa. 97, 153
At. 124, 74 A. L. R. 481; Petri v. F. E. Creelman Lumber Co., 199 U. S. 487,
26 S. E. 133, 50 U. S. (L. ed.) 281; Note: 88 A. S. R. 281; Bank v. Yolo County,
104 Cal. 258, 37 Pac. 900.
28 Small v Lutz, 41 Ore. 570, 67 Pac. 421; Powell v. King, 78 Minn. 83,
80 N. W. 850; Public Service Comm. v. City of Indianapolis, 193 Ind. 37,
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two acts can be reconciled by any reasonable hypothesis, this
will be done in order to avoid a repeal.2 9
Thus the special statute of 1923 would not be repealed
by the statute of 1935 unless the latter contained an express
repealing clause. The statute of 1935 being merely a re-
enactment of the Acts of 1881 and 1883 could not ordinarily
repeal an intermediate act such as the Act of 1923, which
qualified and limited the acts of 1881 and 1883, and it has
been held that such intermediate act will be deemed to remain
in force and to qualify and modify the new act in the same
manner as it did the first.30
The case of Monical v. Hesse (49 Ind. App. 302, 94 N. E.
232) is very pertinent to the problem herein and should
determine the answer to the question in hand. In that case
the plaintiff sought to enjoin the school trustees of Orleans
from proceeding with the issue and sale of bonds for the
erection of a school house, unless they proceeded in accordance
with the acts of 1907 (page 655 and 576) providing for
the filing of a petition showing the estimated amount required
to pay for the building and ground, and the passage of a
resolution approving the issue and sale of the bonds.
The appellants contended that the act of 1903 (p. 350)
was a general act applicable to school boards of all incor-
porated cities, and that no provision was contained in said
act for the filing of a petition and the passage of a resolution;
that in 1909 (Acts of 1909, p. 100) the act of 1903 was
amended in practically the same form excepting that it
contained no provisions on the question of submission to
electors in certain cases, and that it also omitted to provide
for the filing of a petition and the passage of a resolution.
Consequently, appellants said that the Acts of 1909 amending
the Acts of 1903 had the effect of repealing by implication the
special acts of 1907 and that the latter had no force or effect.
137 N. E. 705; 1 Sutherland, Stat. Contr. (2d ed.), Sec. 273; Endlich, Interpre-
tation Stat., Sec. 194.
29 Village of Ridgway v. Gallatin Co., 181 Ill. 521, 55 N. E. 146; Louisville
v. Louisville W. Co., 20 Ky. L. R. 1529, 49 S. W. 766.
ao Public Service Comm. v. City of Indianapolis, 193 Ind. 37, 137 N. E. 705.
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But the court held that such was not the case, and that
the Acts of 1907 qualified and limited the act of 1903, and
that the Act of 1909, being a re-enactment of the Act of
1903, did not repeal the intermediate act of 1907, and the
act of 1907 would qualify and modify the act of 1909 in the
same manner as it did the act of 1903. The language of
the Court was as follows:
"The reason which has been given for the application of these rules
is, that in passing a special act, the legislature had its attention directed
to the special case which the act was made to meet, and it will not
be considered that in passing a later general act it had the special cir-
cumstances in mind which induced the passage of the provisions of
the special act." 31
Thus, under this reasoning, the Act of 1935 being merely
a revision and continuation of an existing general law, cannot
be said to operate as a repeal of the special statute of 1923,
for the Act of 1923 has already engraved an exception on
the general laws of 1881 and 1883 as amended by the Act
of 1935.32 It is a canon of statutory construction, that a
later statute, general in its terms, and not expressly repealing
an earlier statute, will not ordinarily effect a repeal of the
special provision of such earlier statute.13
Under this same reasoning, the Connecticut Court held that:
"Where the intention of the legislature has been called to a par-
ticular subject and a special provision has been made regarding it, it
cannot be supposed that they intended to repeal, when subsequently
enacting a general statute in relation to the same subject." 84
So mere revision and continuation of existing laws by
means of amendment does not operate as a repeal of a
special statute without the legislative intention clearly mani-
fested,35 and inasmuch as there is no such intention shown
31 Monical v. Heise, 49 Ind. A. 302, 94 N. E. 232.
32 Sie R. C. L., page 924.
33 Lewis, Sutherland's Stat. Constr., Sec. 274; Collins Coal Co. v. Hadley,
38 Ind. A. 637, 75 N. E. 832, 78 N. E 353; Potter's Dwarres, Stat., Sec. 154;
Holle v. Drudge, 190 Ind. 520, 129 N. E. 229; Waterworks Co. v. Burkhart,
41 Ind. 364; Worth v. Wheatley, 183 Ind. 598, 103 N. E. 958; Walter v. State,
105 Ind. 589; State v. Kates, 149 Ind. 46, 48 N. E. 365.
34 Coe v. City of Meridan, 45 Conn. 145.
85 Wilson et al. v. Seutman, 74 Ind. A. 112, 121 N. E. 669.
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by the legislature of 1935 to repeal the statute of 1923,
but merely a purpose to revise and continue the old acts of
1881 and 1883, to constitute a repeal would necessitate express
terms, and in the absence of such terms, the presumption is
against the intention. 6
It is a reasonable interpretation, therefore, to construe
the Act of 1935 as an act pertaining only to procedure in
civil cases. While the act still applies to divorce actions,
nevertheless the time of trial of such a divorce within 60 days
from the date of filing still remains restricted in the same
manner and design as before the enactment of the statute
of 1935. As a matter of fact, it has been held that divorce
cases under section 1 of the civil code of 1881 (Acts of 1881,
Sec. 249) are civil actions in such a sense that the rules of
pleading and practice therein provided will apply, except to
the extent that a different procedure may be provided in the
divorce act, and to the extent that it may be apparent that
the legislature provided otherwise.
3 7
The last sentence of the act of 1935 is almost identical
with the last sentence in the act of 1881 as amended in 1883.
There is nothing new or different in the act of 1935 from
the acts of 1881 and 1883 in relation to proceedings in divorce.
It is obvious, therefore, that the change desired to be effected
by the legislature was in reference to the time of trial in civil
matters rather than to proceedings for divorce. Perhaps,
in the absence of the amendment of 1883, which added the
last sentence referring to actions of divorce to the act of
1881, it might have been reasonably contended that the act
of 1935 was new in this regard, and thus showed a legislative
intent to cause a change in the procedure of divorce suits.
But in the manner that it stands, rules of statutory con-
struction set out herein seem to indicate that the act of 1923
remains in full force and unaffected, the same as it was before
the legislative enactment of 1935.
36 Kerney v. Vann, 154 N. C. 311, 70 S. E. 747; Lambert v. Barrett, 115
Va. 136, 78 S. E. 586, Ann. Cas. 1914D, 1226; Mosher v. Osborn, 75 Wash.
439, 134 Pac. 1092, 48 L. R. A. (N. S.) 917; State v. Milwaukee Electric R. R.
Co., 144 Wis. 386, 129 N. W. 623.
37 Powell v. Powell, 104 Ind. 18, 3 N. E. 639.
150
